AØKA08005U Microeconomics III (p)

Volume 2024/2025
Education

MSc programme in Economics – mandatory course at first semester - if not passed before.

 

Bacheloruddannelsen i økonomi – Prioriteret valgfag på 3. år (angivet med et p).

The Danish BSc programme in Economics - prioritized elective at the 3rd year (symbolized by ‘p’).

 

The course is open to:

  • Exchange and Guest students from abroad
  • Credit students from Danish Universities
  • Open University students
Content

This course furthers the introduction of game theory and its applications in economic models. The student who successfully completes the course will learn the basics of game theory and will be enabled to work further with advanced game theory. The student will also learn how economic problems involving strategic situations can be modeled using game theory, as well as how these models are solved. The course intention is that the student becomes able to work with modern economic theory, for instance within the areas of industrial organization, macroeconomics, international economics, labor economics, public economics, political economics and financial economics.

 

In the process of the course the student will learn about

  •     Static games with complete information,
  •     Static games with incomplete information,
  •     Dynamic games with complete information,
  •     Dynamic games with incomplete information, 

The first part of the course is devoted to static games with complete information. This part of the course extends the initial treatment of the subject from Microeconomics II (Mikroøkonomi II). The concept of a normal form game and solution concepts such as dominance and Nash Equilibrium are reintroduced in a formally rigorous way. Students will also study a variety of economic applications of the theory. Finally, they will look more deeply into the theory of static games with complete information by studying mixed strategies and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and discussing equilibrium existence.

 

The second part of the course extends the treatment of dynamic games with complete information. The students will learn this theory in a more rigorous way and discuss various economic applications. The students will then study games with imperfect information and repeated games. They will be introduced to extensive form games, and will learn about the relevant refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept: subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Again, the theory will be illustrated by economic applications.

 

In the third part of the course the students will study simultaneous games of incomplete information. They will learn about the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and apply their knowledge to different kinds of auctions, mechanism design problems, and other applications.

 

The fourth part of the course is devoted to dynamic games of incomplete information. The students will analyze the implications of introducing sequential moves into the games with incomplete information. They will gain knowledge of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and its refinements, and will apply the theory to signaling games and other relevant economic problems. In particular, they will look into the job-market signaling model of Spence and other asymmetric information models.

Learning Outcome

After completing the course the student is expected to be able to:

 

Knowledge:

  • Formally state the definition of a game and explain the key differences between games of different types (static games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of complete information, and dynamic games of incomplete information).
  • In detail account for the equilibrium (solution) concepts that are relevant for these games (Nash Equilibrium, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium).
  • Identify a number of special games and particular issues associated with them, such as repeated games (including infinitely repeated games), auctions and signaling games.

 

Skills:

  • Explicitly solve for the equilibria of these games.
  • Explain the relevant steps in the reasoning of the solution.
  • Interpret the outcomes of the analysis.
  • Apply equilibrium refinements and discuss the solution concepts
  • Evaluate and debate the crucial assumptions underlying the theory.

 

Competencies:

  • Analyze strategic situations by modeling them as formal games.
  • Set up, prove, analyze and apply the theories and methods used in the course in an independent manner.

Syllabus: Spring 2024:

  • Robert Gibbons. A Primer in Game Theory. Prentice Hall 1992.
  • Some short additional materials (can be downloaded from Absalon)

 

Syllabus: Autumn 2025:

  • Robert Gibbons. A Primer in Game Theory. Prentice Hall 1992. (The book is not mandatory to have. Lecture slides and other free online material can be used instead).
  • Some short additional materials (can be downloaded from Absalon)
The course requires knowledge equivalent to that achieved in Microeconomics I and Microeconomics II at the Bachelor of Economics, University of Copenhagen
The teaching will consist of lectures, as well as exercise classes. While the lectures will discuss and put perspectives on the curriculum, the exercise classes will focus on exercises and applications of the theory. Some relevant experiments will be discussed.
Schedule:

Autumn 2024
3 hours lectures a week from week 36 to 50 (except week 42).
3 hours exercise classes a week from week 36/37 to 50 (except week 42).

Spring 2025:
3 hours lectures a week from week 6 to 20.
3 hours exercise classes a week from week 6/7 to 20/21.
  • Category
  • Hours
  • Lectures
  • 42
  • Class Instruction
  • 42
  • Preparation
  • 120
  • Exam
  • 2
  • Total
  • 206
Written
Oral
Individual
Collective

 

The teaching assistants give the students individual, written feedback for three mandatory assignments. The lecturer gives collective oral feedback for quizzes and games played during the lecture.

Credit
7,5 ECTS
Type of assessment
On-site written exam, 3 hours under invigilation
Type of assessment details
ITX-exam in the exam venues of the university.
Exam registration requirements

To qualify for the exam the student must during the semester and no later than the given deadlines:

  • Hand in and have approved 3 out of 3 mandatory assignments.
Aid
Without aids
Marking scale
7-point grading scale
Censorship form
No external censorship
Exam period

Exam information:

The examination date can be found in the exam schedule  here

The exact time and place will be available in Digital Exam from the middle of the semester. 

More information about examination, rules, aids etc. at Master(UK), Master(DK) and Bachelor(DK).

Re-exam

Same as the ordinary exam. 

You must hand in and have approved 3 out of 3 mandatory assignments for qualifying to the reexam.

 

Exam information:

The reexamination date/period can be found in the reexam schedule  here

Exact day, time and place: See Digital Exam in February/August. 

More info: Master(UK),Master(DK), Bachelor.

Criteria for exam assesment

Students are assessed on the extent to which they master the learning outcome for the course.

 

In order to obtain the top grade “12”, the student must with no or only a few minor weaknesses be able to demonstrate an excellent performance displaying a high level of command of all aspects of the relevant material and can make use of the knowledge, skills and competencies listed in the learning outcomes.

 

In order to obtain the passing grade “02”, the student must in a satisfactory way be able to demonstrate a minimal acceptable level of  the knowledge, skills and competencies listed in the learning outcomes.