HFIK03724U FILO, Module 3: Classical Philosophical Problem: Confirmation and Hypothesis Testing

“What connection between an observation and a theory makes that observation evidence for the theory? In some ways, this has been the fundamental problem in the last hundred years of philosophy of science” (Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality, Chicago 2003). The aim of this course is to understand the fundamental problem of how scientific data can confirm or disconfirm a scientific theory. In the first half of the course, I will introduce and discuss some of the dominant theories of confirmation, such as the ‘deductive-nomological theory’, Popper’s ‘falsificationism’, and the more recent ‘Bayesian’ confirmation theory. We will be looking into a number of central problems, such as the ‘problem of induction’, ‘the ravens problem’ and Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’. In the second half of the course, we will apply the philosophical confirmation theories to contemporary discussions in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Confirmation theory can help us understand the contemporary debates on how neural and behavioural data can serve as evidence for a psychological model. We will read philosophical works by, among others, Hempel, Goodman, Popper, Woodward, Earman, Sober, and Machery, as well as scientific texts by cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists.