ASTK12264U Democracy, the State, and International Development

Volume 2014/2015
Content

Why is it that some countries are rich, while others linger in poverty? And why are subjects in some countries allowed to select their rulers, while in others they are not? Why, moreover, is it that the two groups overlap – that democracies tend to be rich countries (or, vice versa, that democracies are generally rich)? These are the fundamental, first-order questions around which the course is structured. We hope to provide some answers and, at least, answering these question, the course will do three things: (1) introduce the institutionalist turn in international development, with special attention to the role of the state; (2) introduce a growing empirical literature as well as the theories which examines the historical and contemporaneous origins of democracy; and (3) relate the literatures on democracy and development and explore the association between the two.

The last two decades have witnessed an institutionalist focus in the study and practice of international development, arguing essentially that political institutions are the root cause of poverty. In the practice of international development, this has given rise to a paradigm of institutional reform as a means to escape poverty. This reform agenda (sometimes referred to as the Augmented Washington Consensus) clearly includes democratization, which is often by politicians claimed to be a means to achieve economic development in the Third World. Well - is it?

Learning Outcome

The aim of the course is to bring students up to date with the latest institutional research on international development and a growing empirical literature on the determinants of democracy. At a more fundamental level, the course will shed light on the interconnectedness of political science theory and economics. While independent empirical analysis is not required to pass the course, the student will be exposed to and gain a strong familiarity with empirical work, quantitative as well as qualitative. Thereby, the student will get a practical feel for fundamental and general problems of empirical work (such as correlation vs causation) and will be exposed to practical methods of circumventing these problems. Overall, the course will improve the student’s ability to critically assess, understand and question empirical work in other academic fields or in professional applications.

The course is relevant for all students with an interest in comparative politics, political economy, international political economy (IPE), political history, economic development, as well as applied large-N/statistical analyses.

While a detailed reading list will be available at the start of the semester, the short list below should serve to give the interested student an idea of the course content.

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006): “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 1, February 2006

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001): "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation", American Economic Review, 91 (5): 1369-1401. (32).

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2002): “Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4): 1231-1294.

Bates, Robert H. and Donald Lien (1985): "A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative Government", Politics and Society 14: 53-70.
Blaydes, Lisa and Eric Chaney (forthcoming): “The Feudal Revolution and Europe’s Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World Before 1500 CE”.

Bockstette, Valerie, Areendam Chanda, and Louis Putterman (2002): “States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start”, Journal of Economic Growth 7: 347-369.

Boix, Carles (2011): “Democracy, Development, and the International System”, American Political Science Review.

Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." Public Choice 143.1-2 (2010): 67-101.

Comin, Diego, William Easterly, and Erick Gong (2010): Was the Wealth of Nations Determined 1000 BC?”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2: 65-97.

Ertman, Thomas (1997): Birth of the Leviathan, Chapter 1.

Gennaioli, Nicola; Rainer, Ilia (2007): “The Modern Impact of Precolonial Centralization in Africa”, Journal of Economic Growth 12(3).

Goertz, Gary (2006): Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. pp. 95-127 and 237-267.
Lipset, Seymour Martin (1959): “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, American Political Science Review.

Hariri, Jacob (2014): “Kausal inferens i statskundskaben”, Politica.

Hariri, Jacob Gerner (2012): “A Contribution to the Understanding of Muslim and Middle Eastern Exceptionalism, revision for The Journal of Politics.

Hariri, Jacob Gerner (2012): “The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood”, American Political Science Review, 106(3): 471-494.

Hariri, Jacob Gerner, Jeanet Bentzen, and James Robinson (2013): “The Indigenous Roots of Representation”, Working Paper.

Herbst, Jeffrey (2000): “States and Power in Africa”, Chapters 1, 2, and 5 (pp. 11-57 and 139-172). New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Hui, Victoria Tin-bor (2004): “Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe”, International Organization.

Lange, Matthew. 2004. “British Colonial Legacies and Political Development.” World Development, 32(6):905-922.

Meier, Gerald M. and James E. Rauch (2005): “How to Read a Regression Table”, Appendix in Leading Issues in Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Michalopoulos, Stelios and Elias Papaioannou (2012): “Precolonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development”, forthcoming Econometrica.

Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath og Ernest Sergenti (2001). Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach. Journal of Political Economy 112 (4): 725-753. (28).

Munck, Gerado L. and Jay Verkuilen (2002): "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices", Comparative Political Studies, 35(1): 5-34.

North, D. C. (1981): “Structure and Change in Economic History”, chapters 1 and 3, pp. 3-13 and 20-33.

North, D. C. (1990): “Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA. pp. 11-72. Available online at kb.dk.

North, Douglass and Barry Weingast (1989): “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governinc Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England”, The Journal of Economic History, XLIX(4).

Nunn, Nathan (2008): “The Long Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(1): 139-176.

Nunn, Nathan and Diego Puga (2012): Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa”, The Review of Economics and Statistics 94(1): 20-36.

Olsson, Ola and Christopher Paik (2013): “A Western Reversal Since the Neolithic? The Long-Run Impact of Early Agriculture”, Forthcoming Econometrica. 


 

The course will be a mix of lectures and discussions of the day’s topics - with the weight on interactive lectures
  • Category
  • Hours
  • Class Instruction
  • 28
  • Exam
  • 79
  • Preparation
  • 168
  • Total
  • 275
Credit
10 ECTS
Type of assessment
Oral examination
Synopsisexam
Marking scale
7-point grading scale
Censorship form
External censorship
Criteria for exam assesment

Criteria for achieving the goals:

  • Grade 12 is given for an outstanding performance: the student lives up to the course's goal description in an independent and convincing manner with no or few and minor shortcomings
  • Grade 7 is given for a good performance: the student is confidently able to live up to the goal description, albeit with several shortcomings
  • Grade 02 is given for an adequate performance: the minimum acceptable performance in which the student is only able to live up to the goal description in an insecure and incomplete manner