AØKK08089U Political Economics

Volume 2013/2014
MSc in Economics
The course provides a broad overview of modern political economics. It deals with the interaction of politics and economics, using formal game-theoretic models to understand the implications for economic policy of various political settings and institutions. The course relates the theoretical predictions to real world examples and systematic empirical finding.
Learning Outcome

In the process of the course the student shall acquire the knowledge about the basic and more advanced theoretical models of different aspects of political-economic process as well as ways and results of empirical assessment of these models. Specifically, the student shall acquire knowledge about the tools of modeling and empirical results on

  • Electoral competition and voter behavior;
  • Partisan politics and political agency;
  • Redistributive aspects of politics;
  • Dynamic policy problems such as politics of public debt and political business cycles;
  • Impact of different political institutions on economic policy;
  • Relationship between politics and development;
  • Politics and media;
  • Politics and finance.

To obtain the highest grade, the students should, in a convincing way, be able to: 1) apply methods and results from the list of topics above to analyze variations and extensions on these and closely related topics within political economics; 2) discuss assumptions and methods of same; and (3) place and discuss the topics within both a Danish and international practical and empirical context at the level corresponding to that presented in class.

Persson and Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics, selections from chapters 2-10, 13
Besley and Case (1995), “Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits”, QJE
Baron and Ferejohn (1989), “Bargaining in Legislatures” American Political Science Review
Persson and Tabellini (2004), "Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes", AER
Hanssen (2004), "Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?," AER, vol. 94(3), pages 712-729.
Alt and Lassen (2006), "Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and Debt in OECD Countries." European Economic Review
Alt and Lassen (2006), “Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD countries” AJPS.
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001), “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, AER
Persson (2005), "Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development", NBER WP.
Besley and Prat (2006), ”Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability”, AER;
Strömberg (2004b), ”Radio's Impact on Public Spending”, QJE
Kroszner (1999), "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation", working paper, University of Chicago.
Pagano and Volpin (2005), "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," AER, vol. 95(4), pages 1005-1030.
Public Finance introduces some topics, but is not a prerequisite. Some familiarity with game theory is required.
3 hours of lectures per week for 14 weeks.
  • Category
  • Hours
  • Exam
  • 3
  • Lectures
  • 42
  • Preparation
  • 161
  • Total
  • 206
7,5 ECTS
Type of assessment
Written examination, 3 hours under invigilation
3 hours written exam taking place at Peter Bangs Vej 36.
Without aids
Marking scale
7-point grading scale
Censorship form
External censorship
100 % censurship
Exam period
Will be updated before the start of the semester
Same as ordinary. But if only a few students have registered for the re-exam, the exam might change to an oral exams with a synopsis to be handed in. This means that the examination date also will change.
Criteria for exam assesment
The Student must in a satisfactory way demonstrate that he/she has mastered the learning outcome of the course.