ASTK12147U Democracy and International Development

Årgang 2013/2014
Engelsk titel

Democracy and International Development

Kursusindhold

Why is it that some countries are rich, while others linger in poverty? And why are subjects in some countries allowed to select their rulers, while in others they are not? Why, moreover, is it that the two groups overlap – that democracies tend to be rich countries (or, vice versa, that democracies are generally rich)? These are the fundamental, first-order questions around which the course is structured. We hope to provide some answers and, at least, answering these question, the course will do three things: (1) introduce the institutionalist turn in international development; (2) introduce a growing empirical literature as well as the theories which examines the historical and contemporaneous origins of democracy; and (3) relate the literatures on democracy and development and explore in detail the association between the two.

The last two decades have witnessed an institutionalist focus in the study and practice of international development, arguing essentially that political institutions are the root cause of poverty. In the practice of international development, this has given rise to a paradigm of institutional reform as a means to escape poverty. This reform agenda (sometimes referred to as the Augmented Washington Consensus) clearly includes democratization, which is often by politicians claimed to be a means to achieve economic development in the Third World. Well - is it?
Målbeskrivelser

The aim of the course is to bring students up to date with the latest institutional research on international development as well as a growing empirical literature on the determinants of democracy. At a more fundamental level, the course will shed light on the interconnectedness of political science theory and economics. While independent empirical analysis is not required to pass the course, the student will be exposed to and gain a strong familiarity with empirical work, quantitative as well as qualitative. Thereby, the student will get a practical feel for fundamental and general problems of empirical work (such as correlation vs causation) and will be exposed to practical methods of circumventing these problems. Overall, the course will improve the student’s ability to critically assess, understand and question empirical work in other academic fields or in professional applications.

The course is relevant for all students with an interest in comparative politics, political economy, international political economy (IPE), political history, economic development, as well as applied large-N/statistical analyses.

While a detailed reading list will be available at the start of the semester, the short list below should serve to give the interested student an idea of the course content.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2002): ”Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (4): 1231-1294.

Downing, Brian M. (1992): The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ertman, Thomas (1997): Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huntington, Samuel (1991): The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Levi, Margaret (1989): Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin (1959) “Some Social Prerequisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, American Political Science Review, vol.53, pp.69-105

North, D. C. (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, New York and Cambridge.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2003): The economic effects of  constitutions, MIT Press, Cambridge.

Przeworski, Adam (2004): “Institutions Matter?”, Government and Opposition, 39(4): 527-540.

Przeworski, Adam; Michael M. Alvarez; Jose Antonio Cheibub; and Fernando Limongi (2000): Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

James Robinson (2006) “Economic Development and Democracy” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 9: 503-527.

Shepsle, K. A. (2005): “Old Questions and New Answers about Institutions: The Riker Objection Revisited”, Harvard University Working Paper.

Shepsle, K. A. (2001): “A Comment on Institutional Change”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3(3), 321-325.

The course will be a mix of lectures, student presentations, and discussions - with the weight on lectures.
  • Kategori
  • Timer
  • Eksamen
  • 79
  • Forberedelse
  • 168
  • Holdundervisning
  • 28
  • I alt
  • 275
Point
10 ECTS
Prøveform
Mundtlig prøve
An oral exam based on a synopsis written by the student
Bedømmelsesform
7-trins skala
Censurform
Ekstern censur
Kriterier for bedømmelse
  • Grade 12 is given for an outstanding performance: the student lives up to the course’s goal description in an independent and convincing manner with no or few and minor shortcomings
     
  • Grade 7 given for a good performance: the student is confidently able to live up to the goal description, albeit with several shortcomings
     
  • Grade 02 is given for an adequate performance: the minimum acceptable performance in which the student is only able to live up to the goal description in an insecure and incomplete manner